Why Pakistan and the Taliban are at War with Each Other

The dynamic between the Afghan Taliban regime and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has descended into open, kinetic conflict, marking a profound strategic failure for Islamabad. The initial sense of triumphalism in some Pakistani circles following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has entirely vanished, supplanted by what observers describe as a feeling of strategic betrayal and a security vacuum. The core of the current state of war is the fundamental asymmetry in the post-withdrawal regional arrangement that each side envisioned and expected from the other.

The Collapse of Post-Withdrawal Expectations

The recent, intense escalation in October 2025, which saw cross-border airstrikes and the largest clashes since the Taliban takeover, has confirmed the evaporation of any post-withdrawal honeymoon. The relationship has since suffered a new nadir following the failure of high-stakes peace negotiations in Turkey.

Islamabad’s Disappointment Over the ‘Vassal State’ Dynamic

Within Pakistan’s strategic establishment, there was a persistent, albeit perhaps unspoken, expectation that the Taliban leadership would function as a compliant client state, indebted for decades of historical political and logistical backing. This perception was predicated on the belief that this debt translated into unquestioning cooperation on Pakistan’s paramount security interests, especially concerning the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Taliban’s increasingly autonomous behaviour—building its own foreign policy, seeking direct engagement with other nations, and openly challenging Pakistani military actions—has been interpreted by the Pakistani establishment as defiance against the very order they believed they helped establish. This rejection of an assumed master-vassal relationship serves as a major political and emotional catalyst for Pakistan’s hardened retaliatory stance.

The Unfulfilled Promise of Security Cooperation After August Two Thousand Twenty One

Since August 2021, relations have been a volatile mix of high-level diplomacy and sharp military confrontation. Pakistan had strongly anticipated that a friendly government in Kabul would immediately translate into a sustained reduction in cross-border violence, demanding rigorous action against groups hostile to the Pakistani state. While some initial reports suggested a temporary withdrawal of certain TTP elements, this did not materialize into the necessary sustained decline in terrorist incidents. Subsequent attempts at brokering peace, such as mediated talks in 2022 and the recent Doha agreement in October 2025, ultimately collapsed, leaving Islamabad profoundly impatient with what it perceives as the Taliban’s deliberate stalling tactics regarding security progress. The central, failed assumption was that the Taliban would prioritize Pakistan’s security needs over the bonds with groups like the TTP.

The Enduring Historical and Ethnic Fault Lines

The current military confrontations are not isolated incidents but the latest flare-up along deeply entrenched historical grievances and ethno-cultural realities that have defined the relationship across the artificial boundary for over a century. These underlying structural tensions ensure that military confrontation is always near the surface of diplomatic engagement.

The Lingering Legacy of the Colonial Era and the Undisputed Border

A primary, seemingly intractable element fueling instability is the very nature of the demarcation line separating the two nations: the Durand Line. This boundary, established in 1893 during the British colonial era, remains a significant political and geographic irritant for nearly all Afghan political factions, including the current Taliban regime. Multiple reports confirm that the Afghan Taliban explicitly refuses to recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate, permanent international border, pushing back against Pakistan’s efforts to erect permanent fencing. Any Pakistani action asserting control near this line is viewed by Kabul as a violation of what they consider undemarcated national space, creating a perpetual state of tension. Concessions on this historical point are politically toxic for any Afghan leadership, cementing the geographical feature as a permanent conflict catalyst.

Shared Pashtun Identity and Deobandi School Affiliations

Beyond politics and geography, powerful ethno-cultural bonds link substantial populations across the frontier, fostering a shared sense of identity that often supersedes national allegiance to either Kabul or Islamabad. A significant portion of the borderland population shares a common Pashtun ethnic ancestry. Furthermore, many adhere to the Deobandi school of jurisprudence, creating a commonality in religious interpretation between the Afghan Taliban and certain elements within Pakistani militant groups like the TTP. This deep-seated social and religious overlap provides a resilient foundation for TTP sanctuary and sympathy that Pakistan’s hard-line demands struggle to dislodge, making a sustained, forceful war by the Afghan Taliban against TTP fighters—often seen as co-religionists—inherently complicated.

Failed Diplomacy and Eroding Trust

Repeated attempts to manage the escalating crisis through dialogue and negotiation have proven insufficient, with trust depleted between the two hardened positions and recent high-stakes talks collapsing, signaling a new low in bilateral relations.

The Breakdown of High-Level Peace Negotiations in Istanbul

A significant diplomatic effort took place over several days in Istanbul starting around October 25, 2025, intended to pull the relationship back from the brink following the lethal October clashes. This round followed a ceasefire agreement reached in Doha on October 19, brokered by Türkiye and Qatar. However, these negotiations ultimately failed to produce a conclusive resolution. Pakistani officials, through Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, publicly attributed the failure to the Taliban’s unyielding refusal to take decisive action against banned organizations operating within their jurisdiction. Conversely, Afghan media sources suggested the Pakistani delegation walked away after finding some of their core demands unacceptable, characterizing Pakistan’s posture as unnecessarily undiplomatic. This failure confirms the relationship has sunk to a profoundly challenging low, particularly following an earlier hopeful diplomatic upgrade in May 2025.

The Significance of Pakistan’s Drone Strike Admission in Talks

One of the most revealing moments during the collapsed Istanbul discussions was the reported admission by a representative of the Pakistani delegation concerning ongoing aerial activity over Afghan soil. In a stunning disclosure cited by Afghan and diplomatic sources, the Pakistani delegate conceded that Islamabad could not prevent certain drone strikes because it was operating under an existing, “confidential agreement” with an unnamed foreign country (widely implied to be the US). This admission carried immense weight; it appeared to confirm Kabul’s long-standing accusation of airspace violations and exposed a strategic dependency in Pakistan’s counterterrorism approach that the Taliban could leverage. The Taliban reiterated their demand that Pakistan cease all such overflights, while Pakistan simultaneously insisted on the right to unilaterally act against groups like the TTP within Afghan airspace, illustrating the core conflict of sovereignty versus unilateral action.

The Taliban’s Internal Balancing Act

For the ruling entity in Afghanistan, the security demands originating from Islamabad are not simple external pressures; they create complex internal political hazards that must be meticulously managed to preserve the cohesion of the movement that successfully seized national power.

Risk of Internal Fissures from Cracking Down on Comrades

The Afghan Taliban leadership is acutely aware that fully committing to Pakistan’s security agenda—specifically, launching a comprehensive military campaign against the TTP—carries the substantial risk of fracturing its own ranks. Given the deep ideological and social ties shared between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban, moving against the TTP could be viewed by many fighters as a betrayal of shared religious principles and a concession to an ‘illegitimate regime’ in Islamabad. Such action could foster severe disillusionment among frontline fighters, potentially leading to defections toward more radical, anti-Pakistan elements within the broader militant ecosystem. To avert this internal fracturing, the Taliban leadership has consistently sought more time from Islamabad, signaling that wholesale military action against the TTP is politically unfeasible for the current administration.

Strategic Need to Counter Rivals Like the Islamic State Khorasan Province

Furthermore, any concentrated effort by the Afghan Taliban to eradicate the TTP could inadvertently create a dangerous power vacuum exploited by their primary existential and ideological threat: the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP or Daesh). The Taliban regards ISKP as a far more dangerous entity seeking to undermine their rule through extreme violence and ideological purity tests. If the Afghan Taliban expends significant military resources fighting the TTP—which operates under a similar, albeit distinct, ideological umbrella—it could leave their flanks dangerously exposed to sudden, ruthless attacks from ISKP elements aiming to capitalize on any perceived weakness or internal division. Thus, maintaining strategic distance or tolerance towards the TTP functions not only as ideological deference but as a calculated strategic move to maintain internal stability and prioritize neutralizing the immediate threat posed by ISKP affiliates.

Broader Regional Ramifications and Economic Strain

The breakdown in security and diplomatic channels between these two neighbors inevitably spills over, creating significant economic distress for Afghanistan, a nation already contending with international isolation and fragility.

The Disruption of Vital Commercial and Humanitarian Transit Routes

One of the most immediate and tangible consequences of heightened military tensions and subsequent border friction has been the severe disruption of the vital arteries for trade and humanitarian aid flowing between the two nations. In response to escalating violence, the Pakistani security apparatus has implemented stringent measures, including the significant tightening of visa protocols and the virtual closure of major overland crossings such as Spin Boldak-Chaman. For Afghanistan, which relies heavily on Pakistan for transit to sea routes and as a principal trade partner, these closures inflict substantial daily financial losses and create severe bottlenecks for essential supplies. This economic pressure adds a significant layer of strain on the Taliban government, which desperately needs to project economic self-sufficiency to attain international legitimacy.

The Search for Alternative Economic Lifelines and Geopolitical Diversification

The imposed strain on the Pakistan-Afghanistan trade corridor has created a powerful incentive for the Taliban administration to accelerate efforts to diversify its external economic engagement, even while seeking recognition from Islamabad. The tightening of the Pakistani border effectively compels Kabul to lean more heavily on alternative routes and partners, most notably by increasing its reliance on overland transit through Iran, specifically utilizing the Chabahar port facilities. This forced geopolitical diversification represents a long-term strategic shift that diminishes Afghanistan’s dependency on the goodwill of the Pakistani establishment. The Taliban’s pursuit of engagement with other regional powers, such as Russia’s recent acceptance of their ambassador, further indicates a determined attempt to carve out an independent regional standing—a maneuver Pakistan, preferring a dependent Kabul, views with deep suspicion. This pursuit of autonomy in economic and foreign policy fundamentally challenges Pakistan’s historical aspiration to retain overarching influence over its western neighbor’s external relations.

Historical Context and Evolving Geopolitical Calculus

To fully grasp the current severity, one must contextualize the present conflict against the backdrop of shared military history and the vast shifts in the global security landscape following the 2021 withdrawal of major Western military forces from the region.

Pakistan’s Shifting Security Calculus Following the US Military Withdrawal

The departure of the United States military apparatus in the summer of 2021 fundamentally upended the long-established security calculus for Pakistan. During the two-decade international presence, the combined pressure from US military operations—particularly drone surveillance and targeted strikes—alongside direct American pressure on the Taliban to restrain the TTP, provided a crucial strategic buffer for Islamabad. With this external military support system removed, the vacuum emboldened the TTP, resulting in a dramatic surge in cross-border terrorist activity targeting Pakistani interests. Now forced to confront the TTP threat largely on its own, without the extensive intelligence sharing and precision targeting capabilities previously available, Pakistan has adopted a significantly more aggressive and overt retaliatory posture against Afghan territory, signaling a desperate attempt to establish a new deterrence framework.

The Growing Role of External Mediation and Regional Alignment

The direct, kinetic conflict between the two entities has elevated the importance of third-party mediation in South Asian security affairs. The reliance on nations like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which maintain credibility and trust with both the Pakistani establishment and the Taliban leadership, underscores the severity of the current breakdown. Furthermore, the broader geopolitical landscape, which has seen increased involvement from regional players like Russia (which formally recognized the Taliban government) and engagement from India, adds complexity. Pakistan’s desire to leverage a degree of Western alignment to press for an inclusive Afghan government contrasts sharply with the Taliban’s quest for full, independent regional acceptance, positioning the sides at odds within the shifting sands of emerging great power competition. The current war is thus not purely a bilateral matter, but a flashpoint in evolving international alignments.

The Future Trajectory and Potential for De-escalation

Looking ahead from the volatile autumn of 2025, the path toward sustained peace remains obscure, clouded by the structural conflicts of ideology, sovereignty, and historical expectation that have thus far resisted diplomatic resolution and military deterrence.

Impediments to Re-establishing a Meaningful Political Dialogue

Despite the recent diplomatic successes in securing temporary ceasefires, the fundamental impediments to reaching a conclusive, lasting peace agreement remain firmly in place. Negotiations are repeatedly held hostage by irreconcilable differences over actionable security cooperation: namely, Pakistan’s non-negotiable demand for the dismantling of TTP infrastructure versus the Taliban’s non-negotiable demand for an end to Pakistani cross-border military incursions. Moreover, the Pakistani political sphere itself may present an obstacle; certain domestic Islamist political factions might offer little support for military escalation against a group ideologically proximate to them, further limiting Islamabad’s operational freedom and resolve in a prolonged confrontation. Any lasting solution necessitates one side fundamentally altering its core security posture—a concession that neither the Pakistani state nor the Taliban leadership appears prepared to make given current internal political realities.

The Imperative for Trusted, Sustainable Mediation

Given the deeply entrenched positions, the prospect of any sustainable resolution in the near term appears to rest heavily on the shoulders of external parties capable of building bridges where direct communication has failed. The role of trusted mediators, particularly those from the Middle East and the broader Muslim world who command respect from both the Pakistani military and the Afghan Taliban, is paramount. These actors must possess the sustained engagement capacity to move beyond brokering temporary truces and instead facilitate genuine political dialogue aimed at deconflicting the core issues of border management, terrorism, and mutual recognition. Without such an external, trusted hand guiding the process, the current pattern—escalation, fierce fighting, brief ceasefire, and renewed friction—is destined to become the enduring and tragic new normal along this volatile, strategically vital frontier. The cycle of violence represents a failure not just of bilateral relations, but of the regional diplomatic architecture to manage this intensely complex relationship born from historical partition and ideological proximity.