Opinion | There is no middle ground on the Venezuela strikes

The recent, aggressive military posture adopted by the Executive Branch against alleged narcotics trafficking networks linked to Venezuela has irrevocably fractured the hemispheric dialogue. What began as targeted, though controversial, maritime interdictions has evolved into a rapidly escalating military confrontation, forcing a stark, binary choice upon the American political landscape. As detailed in The Washington Post on December 6, 2025, the controversy surrounding the tactical execution of these strikes—specifically the highly scrutinized “double-tap” on September 2—is now secondary to the fundamental question: Is the underlying, warped policy itself legitimate? The current trajectory offers no quiet, mutually agreeable ‘middle ground’; instead, it has set the stage for a profound constitutional crisis and potentially a broader armed conflict, with the stability of the entire Western Hemisphere in the balance.

V. The Expanding Scope of Military Involvement

The initial phase of the naval campaign, characterized by lethal strikes against alleged drug vessels in international waters, was presented as a decisive demonstration of resolve. However, the rhetoric emanating from the administration in late 2025 suggests a significant, imminent escalation that pushes the boundaries of military authorization far beyond the maritime domain.

V.A. From Maritime Operations to Threats of Terrestrial Engagement

The operational pattern has decisively moved beyond the established scope of disabling sea vessels. Public pronouncements from the President have explicitly foreshadowed the commencement of operations targeting traffickers on land “very soon” (cite: 4, cite: 6). While the administration has remained vague on the precise geographical coordinates or the timing of these potential incursions, this threat signals a potential move toward inserting forces onto sovereign Venezuelan territory or launching strikes deep inland. This represents a major operational escalation that fundamentally surpasses the earlier maritime engagements, moving closer to a direct, sustained confrontation with established ground forces or militias (cite: 11, cite: 14).

V.B. Regional Alarm Over Escalation and Precedent Setting

The potential for land strikes is viewed by many international analysts as dramatically increasing the risk of an unintended, or even intended, large-scale armed conflict within the South American nation (cite: 6). Such a conflict would inevitably generate a massive wave of displaced persons heading toward the nation’s southern borders, a scenario directly contradicting the administration’s stated hardline immigration policy goals to secure the southern border (cite: 5). More disturbingly to critics, the current approach sets a dangerous international precedent: the legitimation of unilateral military action by one major power against a sovereign nation under the broad, convenient banner of counter-narcotics enforcement. This move is seen as an attempt to reassert the practical authority of the Monroe Doctrine over Latin America (cite: 6).

VI. Deeper Structural Flaws in the Underlying Strategy

Beyond the immediate tactical questions of the strikes, the entire structural justification for the policy is undergoing intense scrutiny regarding its long-term viability and its actual alignment with stated goals, particularly concerning the flow of illicit substances into the nation.

VI.I. The Questionable Efficacy of Narcotics Interdiction as Primary Goal

A critical element undermining the official narrative is the actual geographic source of the primary drug threats facing the nation, as assessed in late 2025. Current intelligence, such as the 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment, suggests that very little of the country’s deadliest drug threat, illicit fentanyl, transits U.S. borders via the Venezuelan routes being targeted; the vast majority originates in Mexico, where Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) manufacture it using precursor chemicals from China (cite: 4). Cocaine, another significant threat, predominantly flows from Colombia (cite: 6, cite: 9). If the strikes were genuinely aimed at protecting the nation’s immediate drug security, the intense focus on Venezuelan smuggling routes appears strategically misplaced, suggesting that a different, unstated motivation—such as political pressure—is driving the military deployment (cite: 4).

VI.II. Regime Change Ambitions Disguised as Law Enforcement

This perceived misalignment between the stated goal (drug interdiction) and the operational focus (sustained, escalating pressure on the regime) leads many to conclude that the ultimate objective is regime alteration. President Nicolás Maduro has consistently accused the U.S. of employing drug fighting as a flimsy pretext for a power grab and the potential seizure of the country’s valuable energy reserves (cite: 6, cite: 14). For the hawkish faction supporting the administration, removing Maduro—who has maintained power despite extensive sanctions and political challenges since 2013—is viewed as the necessary precursor to resolving broader issues, thereby conflating a foreign policy objective (regime change) with a domestic security objective (drug control). The administration’s designation of the Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua as Foreign Terrorist Organizations served to provide a legal hook for this escalating pressure (cite: 5, cite: 16).

VII. Constitutional and Legislative Challenges to Executive Action

The absence of prior formal authorization for these sustained military actions has brought the debate directly to the legislative branches, where the legality under domestic constitutional law is being rigorously tested in late 2025.

VII.I. Scrutiny Under the War Powers Framework

Legal experts widely assert that the sustained series of lethal attacks, even if conducted by drone from a distance, likely falls under the purview of “hostilities” as defined by the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (cite: 19). This statute mandates consultation with Congress before introducing armed forces into such situations without a formal declaration of war or specific authorization. The administration’s stance—that the actions do not constitute hostilities, or that designating a cartel as an enemy grants the necessary authority—is actively being challenged by numerous lawmakers from both major parties (cite: 18). In response to the threat of land strikes, bipartisan groups in both chambers, including Senators Kaine, Paul, Schumer, and Schiff, filed a War Powers Resolution to block any engagement in hostilities within or against Venezuela without Congressional approval (cite: 3, cite: 4, cite: 8). The Senate has twice already rejected earlier resolutions limiting the President’s authority regarding the Venezuelan campaign (cite: 15).

VII.II. Allegations of Domestic Law Violations Beyond Armed Conflict

Furthermore, critics argue that the extra-legal nature of the strikes exists outside of established international conflict law and domestic criminal law. Some legal scholars suggest that the summary execution of individuals on the high seas, particularly those who may be captured or surrendered, implicates domestic statutes concerning murder and conspiracy to commit murder, potentially falling under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for service members involved (cite: 19). This suggests that even if the conflict is not deemed a formal war, the actions may constitute serious criminal offenses under the nation’s own legal code, adding another layer of legal vulnerability to the entire operation.

VIII. Concluding Analysis: The Unavoidable Binary Choice

Ultimately, the intensity of the political and legal fallout surrounding the Venezuelan strikes converges on a single, unavoidable conclusion regarding the framework of the debate itself. The complexities involving Adm. Bradley’s orders, Secretary Hegseth’s intent, and the precise movements of survivors in the video footage are secondary to the foundational endorsement or rejection of the overall strategic premise.

VIII.I. The Focus on the Warped Policy Over Tactical Errors

The core takeaway from the most incisive critiques, exemplified by Jason Willick’s analysis in The Washington Post, is that the controversy over the specific application of force—the “double-tap”—is less significant than the “warped policy that justified the operation at all” (cite: 2). When the initial use of lethal force against alleged traffickers on the high seas is accepted as legitimate by one side, then the subsequent actions taken to ensure the mission’s completion become viewed as necessary extensions of that original, accepted aggression. The moral and political center dissolves when the foundational act itself is deemed a necessary evil by one faction and an unacceptable violation by another (cite: 2).

VIII.II. The Unstable Future of Hemispheric Relations

The era characterized by a bipartisan consensus on how to manage the situation in Venezuela has definitively concluded in 2025. The current approach, rooted in aggressive, unilateral military action, offers no clear path toward the stated political goal of restoring democratic institutions, nor does it offer the desired outcome of stemming irregular migration without risking broader military conflict (cite: 5). The administration’s contradictory actions—escalating military threats while simultaneously managing deportation flights with the Maduro government—demonstrate the policy’s internal inconsistency (cite: 3, cite: 7, cite: 10). As hardline paths seem to be the only ones left on the table—either a soft political removal facilitated by intense military pressure or a hard escalation—the policy has boxed itself into a corner where moderation is no longer a feature of the conversation. The expectation of finding a quiet, mutually agreeable ‘middle ground’ regarding these strikes has vanished, replaced by a stark confrontation between interventionist resolve and anti-interventionist principle, with the stability of the entire hemisphere hanging in the balance.

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