The Case for War Against the Venezuelan Regime: Transitioning from Signaling to Resolution in Late 2025

The geopolitical calculus surrounding the government currently ensconced in Caracas has undergone a material shift in the latter half of 2025. Where past administrations pursued diplomatic isolation and economic strangulation, the current executive branch has inaugurated a campaign of kinetic action against what it defines as transnational criminal organizations operating with the sanction of the state. This escalation—marked by naval deployments and lethal maritime strikes—compels a re-evaluation of the necessary path forward. The following outlines a case for moving beyond mere signaling to decisive engagement, anchored in the regime’s functional identity as a criminal enterprise and the catastrophic, weaponized suffering of the Venezuelan populace.

The Humanitarian Catastrophe as a Precedent for Action

While national security considerations provide the most direct justification for external intervention, the catastrophic humanitarian situation within Venezuela provides a moral and ethical dimension that cannot be ignored, particularly as the regime weaponizes the suffering of its people for political gain.

The Deliberate Generation of a Refugee Crisis

The exodus of millions from Venezuela represents one of the largest and most sustained displacement events in recent history. As of late 2024, approximately 7.9 million Venezuelans had fled the country, with about 6.5 million relocating within the Americas. While economic mismanagement is a clear factor, the argument must address the growing belief among observers that this crisis is, in part, deliberately engineered by the regime to destabilize its neighbors and create a constant source of geopolitical pressure. This weaponization of human misery is increasingly viewed as a strategic export, with some analyses suggesting it follows a playbook utilized by Russia via its allies to destabilize Western interests. The internal repression that enforces this exodus—the systematic crushing of dissent, including post-election crackdowns in mid-2024—is directly supported by foreign security actors, such as Cuban intelligence operatives embedded in Venezuelan security forces. When human suffering is utilized as an active foreign policy tool, the moral justification for intervention gains significant weight.

The Failure of Internal Civil Society to Effect Change

Decades of persistent international pressure have failed to spark a genuine internal collapse of the regime, suggesting that existing opposition structures are either unable or unwilling to overcome the apparatus of repression. The political opposition, even following widely disputed elections—such as the July 2024 contest in which Nicolás Maduro claimed reelection amidst international skepticism—has been unable to translate popular will into actual power. The political deadlock, maintained through systematic suppression and the targeting of activists, implies that purely internal mechanisms for a peaceful democratic transition are exhausted, leaving external, albeit forceful, pressure as the only remaining variable capable of fracturing the ruling clique. The continued presence of Maduro following his January 2025 inauguration underscored this political stagnation.

The Insufficiency of Previous Diplomatic and Economic Measures

A compelling case for war requires demonstrating that all less-than-kinetic options have been thoroughly exhausted without success, thereby rendering the more weighty measure necessary. The history of engagement with the Maduro era demonstrates a pattern of failure for measured responses.

Ineffectiveness of Sanctions Over Time

The campaign of targeted sanctions, while initially promising, has proven insufficient to compel the necessary change in behavior or leadership. Historical analysis suggests that unilateral sanctions aimed at promoting democracy or regime change against autocratic governments have a high failure rate. Instead of leading to capitulation, sanctions appear to have served as a convenient domestic rallying cry for the regime, allowing it to blame external pressures for internal privations, paradoxically reinforcing its grip on power. The prior “maximum pressure” sanctions strategy from 2018 to 2022 is argued to have principally benefitted geopolitical adversaries by rerouting discounted oil exports to China and encouraging reliance on Iranian and Russian investment. Furthermore, the administration’s recent actions—airstrikes on maritime vessels, beginning in September 2025—have been attempted without clear congressional authorization, suggesting an executive branch already operating outside conventional diplomatic parameters in the pursuit of its objectives. The economic reality as of late 2025 shows oil exports at 1.09 million barrels per day in September 2025, the highest level since early 2020, reflecting successful adaptation to constraints.

The Evaporation of Electoral Legitimacy

The regime’s seizure of power through fraudulent means has rendered the concept of domestic political legitimacy moot in the eyes of the international community, especially for those advocating for intervention. The peaceful demonstrations that followed the contested elections did not yield results, highlighting the regime’s absolute rejection of democratic accountability. This complete break with the foundational principle of popular sovereignty removes the primary moral and legal constraint against external pressure short of military engagement, as the governing body has forfeited its right to self-rule by denying it to its people. The inability of the opposition to gain power, despite perceived electoral victories, confirms the totality of the regime’s control apparatus.

Military Signaling as a Necessary Precursor to Resolution

Given the political deadlock and the criminal nature of the regime, the recent, visible escalation of military posture, including the deployment of major naval assets like the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, must be understood not as an end in itself, but as a calculated strategic step in making the case for kinetic options.

The Strategic Value of Visible Force Projection

The massive military buildup in the Caribbean, part of the broader “Operation Southern Spear,” serves as a powerful non-verbal communication aimed at the ruling tier. The objective is not necessarily a full-scale invasion, but an attempt to apply overwhelming psychological pressure, hoping to induce cracks within the regime’s inner circle and prompt a self-organized political transition—a “regime change on the cheap,” as some analysts term it. This level of signaling is meant to demonstrate resolve where prior diplomatic efforts showed hesitation. The deployment of thousands of troops, warships, and advanced assets like F-35 stealth fighters is designed to create an intolerable environment of risk for key power brokers.

Delineating Objectives Beyond Simple Counter-Narcotics

While the stated justification for the initial, often deadly, strikes on boats has been counter-narcotics operations, the deployment of carrier strike groups and advanced air power suggests a broader goal that must be articulated: the degradation of the regime’s command and control structure and its associated TCO elements on land. The case for war is stronger when the objective is clearly defined as neutralizing a hostile, transnational criminal network that uses state structures as its cover, rather than simply interdicting maritime traffic. The administration’s objectives have reportedly broadened beyond drug interdiction to include anti-Maduro regime activities. The identification of land targets—including ports and airstrips allegedly used for drug trafficking—signals an intent to degrade infrastructure on the mainland.

The Legal and Political Justification for Coercive Measures

A true case for war must grapple with the significant legal and political headwinds, acknowledging the need for a durable, justifiable framework beyond the often-contested ‘self-defense against non-state actors’ claim that has been used for the initial strikes.

Establishing the Basis for Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors

The administration has attempted to legitimize its strikes by arguing for a form of self-defense against criminal networks designated as “narco-terrorists,” including the TDA. While legal experts question this stretching of international law in the absence of UN Security Council authorization or clear imminent threat, the argument supporting the case for war must assert that the cumulative effect of the regime’s actions—hosting hostile foreign forces, supporting designated terrorist/criminal entities, and actively trafficking lethal narcotics—constitutes an ongoing armed attack on U.S. interests and regional stability, justifying a more robust response to neutralize the command structure. The legal defense being advanced reportedly blends laws governing criminal drug trafficking with the laws of armed conflict, comparing narcotics to “chemical weapons.” The strikes themselves have been condemned by Venezuela as “serial executions” and an “undeclared war.”

The Precedent of Invoking Historical Legal Frameworks

The administration has explored invoking historical statutes, such as the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, in an attempt to sideline standard due process protections for deportation targets by branding them as agents of a hostile foreign entity. While this specific legal maneuver failed in court, the underlying effort signifies a belief that the Maduro apparatus is not a legitimate government but a belligerent power operating against the U.S. The case for war would argue that this functional assessment, even if legally difficult to sustain for full military action, dictates the necessary level of response, as the regime acts as a criminal syndicate that forfeits conventional sovereign protections. Furthermore, CIA covert actions against the regime have also been confirmed and reported, indicating an executive belief in operating outside typical diplomatic parameters.

The Political Imperative for Transparent Advocacy

The most crucial element missing, as the author of the original article noted, is a clear, sober articulation of the necessity of these escalating actions directly to the American public, rather than relying on court arguments or subordinate’s asides. To launch a conflict without this buy-in is to risk a political firestorm that could undermine the entire endeavor.

Countering the Narrative of Self-Serving Intervention

The administration’s silence fosters the proliferation of cynical conspiracy theories—that the operation is merely about seizing oil reserves, satisfying a political vendetta, or lining the pockets of the military-industrial complex. A compelling case for war requires preemptively dismantling these alternative narratives by clearly showing that the national security and humanitarian stakes outweigh the immediate economic or political costs, thus grounding the action in principled necessity. Regional leaders also view the military buildup with suspicion, seeing it as a return to 20th-century U.S. assertions of control, regardless of the stated counter-narcotics goal.

The Duty to Educate the Electorate on Enduring Threats

Wars require public support, or at least public resignation, to be sustained beyond the initial skirmishes. The public needs to be educated on the long-term threat posed by a hostile, networked, anti-Western regime in the Western Hemisphere. This education must connect the dots between the migrant crisis, the Russian/Cuban/Iranian alliances, and the narcotics trade in a way that makes military engagement appear as a necessary choice for preserving security, not merely a political gambit. The public must be presented with the reality that the regime’s alliances with Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Havana solidify an authoritarian bloc working against democratic norms globally.

Conclusion: The Threshold for Decisive Engagement

The culmination of the preceding points suggests that Venezuela under the current leadership has become a persistent, active threat that leverages criminality and foreign alliances to directly undermine American interests and the stability of its neighbors. The military buildup and initial kinetic strikes are, regardless of their immediate justification, an acknowledgment that softer means have demonstrably failed to alter the core calculus of the regime. The time for a sober, earnest case for necessary force is now, before the situation calcifies further into an intractable regional liability.

Defining Success in a Hypothetical Intervention Scenario

If the argument for kinetic action is accepted, the plan must include clearly defined, limited end-states. Success cannot be vaguely defined as “regime change,” which invites the pitfalls of nation-building and prolonged engagement. Instead, success must be framed as the neutralization of the regime’s transnational criminal capabilities, the securing of demonstrable guarantees against foreign military basing by U.S. adversaries, and the creation of a monitored, transitional framework that allows legitimate democratic elements, perhaps those aligned with opposition figures like Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado, to organize without being immediately branded as foreign-backed traitors.

The Peril of Inaction and the Cost of Future Deferral

The final point of the case must be to impress upon the public the latent danger of continued deferral. Every day the regime remains firmly in power, its ties to hostile external powers deepen, its criminal networks expand, and the internal humanitarian suffering worsens. The cost of avoiding a difficult, decisive action now, framed as a potential limited military undertaking to dismantle criminal command structures, will only translate into a far greater, more complex, and more dangerous regional conflagration in the years to come, one that may not be as easily contained as past, smaller interventions in the hemisphere. The decision to act now is presented as a necessary choice to prevent the situation from becoming an intractable security liability for the entire Western Hemisphere.