The Inevitable Chaos: Why Regime Change Isn’t a Flip of a Switch

The most disquieting takeaway from the simulation exercises—which feel chillingly relevant today with thousands of U.S. troops staged nearby—is the sheer certainty of prolonged chaos following the sudden removal of the current leadership. The consensus was unambiguous: a swift, clean democratic transition is a fantasy given the nation’s structure. Instead, participants forecasted an environment of intractable turmoil, described starkly as “chaos for a sustained period of time with no possibility of ending it.” This isn’t just about a few days of street protests; it’s about the fundamental erosion of all recognized authority.

The Immediate Evaporation of State Control

A critical pillar supporting this grim forecast is the modeled disintegration of the formal state apparatus. Security analysts privy to the findings suggested that the immediate consequence of a power vacuum would be the near-total evaporation of command and control across the national military and the domestic police forces. Think about what that means in practical terms: units cease to take orders from the top and instead devolve into localized power centers. These military components could easily begin operating as independent warlord fiefdoms. When the chain of command snaps, who enforces the law? No one. The most basic functions that keep a society from collapsing—utilities, distribution of food and fuel, public safety—would cease almost instantly. The modeling even incorporated the most visible, immediate sign of institutional failure: widespread civil breakdown characterized by pervasive looting and generalized societal disorder. If you are planning for a *transition*, you need a *partner* to hand authority over to. The simulation starkly illustrated that in this scenario, there would be no reliable, unified local partner; only a collection of armed, competing entities. This complete failure of command structures is the single greatest hurdle for any external party attempting to impose even minimal order or facilitate a new government. Understanding this institutional decay is key to analyzing any forward strategy, and you can read more about the historical precedent for this kind of breakdown when examining the broader landscape of failed state scenarios.

Anatomy of the Vacuum: Fractured Forces and Transnational Threats. Find out more about U.S. war game projection post-Maduro instability.

The complexity of the war game lay not just in predicting the *collapse*, but in mapping the *actors* who would immediately rush to fill the void. The situation is far more layered than a simple confrontation between the regime and a unified opposition.

Internal Military and Security Force Schisms

The simulation deliberately rejected the notion of a monolithic military—either supportive or opposed to a transition. Instead, the security apparatus was modeled as splintering along deep fault lines: ideological, regional, and dangerously, based on the personal loyalties of mid-to-senior level commanders. Reports from the exercise indicated that the analysis accounted for violent clashes between forces still loyal to the former regime and nascent opposition-aligned cells or opportunistic commanders. The crucial dynamic here is that even if the highest leadership vanished, these mid-level and senior officers—who control significant armed assets, loyal battalions, and local territorial control—would become the primary players in the ensuing power struggle. Their loyalty dictates who controls the capital, who controls the oil infrastructure, and who controls the borders. This isn’t a political crisis anymore; it becomes a full-blown, internal military confrontation fought over physical territory and resource access.

The Presence and Role of Transnational Armed Organizations

Moving beyond the internal military structure, the war game had to account for the formidable, entrenched, and highly experienced non-state armed actors operating within Venezuelan territory, particularly along the porous borders. A major concern highlighted was the role these groups could play in exploiting the chaos. We are talking about well-armed insurgent groups with decades of combat experience, notably remnants of Colombian guerrilla armies like the FARC dissidents and the ELN. These organizations view external intervention with extreme hostility and are perfectly positioned to exploit a power vacuum. They would instantly move to expand control over lucrative smuggling routes and resource-rich areas. In fact, current reports from the border region of Catatumbo show continued, intense fighting between the ELN and FARC dissidents as of early 2025, illustrating the pre-existing territorial control these groups already exert and their willingness to engage in conflict. Furthermore, the analysis factored in the influence of powerful domestic criminal organizations and the often violent *colectivos*—a chaotic security soup where multiple, well-armed forces compete for dominance outside any rule of law. This network of actors means that even a successful removal of the regime might simply empower these non-state elements to carve out their own fiefdoms, creating a security environment exponentially more complex than the one it replaced. For a deeper dive into the current border dynamics, see reports on Colombia-Venezuela border security issues.

Echoes of Empire: Learning Caution from Historical Interventions. Find out more about U.S. war game projection post-Maduro instability guide.

The grim predictions about post-conflict fragmentation are not drawn from thin air; they are heavily informed by the messy lessons of recent history. Analysts running the simulation kept a close watch on past international engagements, drawing explicit, cautionary parallels.

Drawing Parallels with Past Overseas Engagements

The foundational case studies informing the Venezuelan modeling were clearly the often disastrous aftermaths of major U.S.-backed interventions in the Middle East and North Africa. The experiences in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya serve as stark reminders of a central axiom: the swift removal of a dictator does not eradicate deeper societal fissures—it often unleashes them. In those instances, eliminating the central, repressive organizing principle—negative though it was—resulted in a free-for-all that plunged the nations into protracted counter-insurgency campaigns, civil strife, and long-term instability. The concern in the Venezuelan exercise was that removing Maduro would similarly trigger a low-intensity conflict that would drain international resources while achieving no lasting political resolution. This historical awareness is what drives the extreme caution surrounding current escalations, including the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean.

Critiques Questioning the Applicability of Precedents

However, no historical analogy is perfect, and the analysis correctly grappled with Venezuela’s unique characteristics. Skeptics of the purely pessimistic outlook argued that Venezuela is distinct from the post-invasion scenarios cited. A minority view suggested a transition might mirror the more contained, short-term successful interventions in smaller Caribbean nations during the late twentieth century, such as Grenada or Panama. Optimists in this camp posited that a negotiated handover to a U.S.-supported successor government could unlock a path toward economic recovery and national reconciliation, potentially bypassing the fragmentation seen elsewhere. But critics quickly countered that the sheer scale, institutional complexity, established internal armed factions, and deep external linkages of Venezuela render those smaller-scale successes irrelevant. The central debate boils down to this: Is the known, albeit repressive, structure of the current regime a better—or at least more predictable—guarantor of minimal order than the completely unknown outcome of its sudden demise? It’s a classic risk assessment problem, trading a known devil for an unknown, potentially much worse one.

The Crucible of Now: Military Pressure and Legal Justification in the Caribbean. Find out more about U.S. war game projection post-Maduro instability tips.

The sobering projections of the war game are currently unfolding in real-time against a backdrop of tangible military escalation in the immediate vicinity of Venezuela, validating the simulation’s focus on external pressure.

The Intensified Maritime and Air Presence in the Caribbean

Since the early autumn months of this year, the region has witnessed a formidable, largely undisguised massing of American naval and air assets. Observers are characterizing this deployment as the largest concentration of military power in the Caribbean since the tense standoff of the early 1960s. Key components include the arrival of the nation’s newest and largest aircraft carrier strike group, the USS *Gerald R. Ford*, the deployment of tactical fighter jets to forward bases like Puerto Rico, and staging of heavy strategic bombers for provocative fly-bys near Venezuelan airspace. This strategic repositioning is unequivocally intended to project power and apply overwhelming pressure on the existing government structures. As of November 21, 2025, the Federal Aviation Administration has even warned pilots to exercise caution over Venezuelan airspace due to the “worsening security situation and heightened military activity”.

The Campaign Against Alleged Trafficking Networks and Legal Framing

This aggressive military posturing is being publicly framed by the current administration through the lens of combating transnational criminal activity, specifically drug trafficking, which the leadership has repeatedly tied to the sitting Venezuelan government. This ‘War on Drugs’ narrative serves a dual purpose: it provides a potential justification for kinetic military action under interdiction statutes and acts as direct intimidation against the regime’s inner circle. The campaign began with targeted kinetic strikes against small maritime vessels, which the U.S. asserts were involved in smuggling operations, reportedly resulting in significant loss of life among those aboard. The increasing lethality of these engagements suggests the military readiness modeled in the war game is being actively tested in the operational environment. This is being cemented by legal maneuvering: in mid-November, the State Department announced the intent to designate the *Cartel de los Soles* as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), effective November 24, 2025. This designation is a powerful tool, as it broadens the scope for military and financial measures, though critics point out that the State Department’s action comes when the Treasury had *previously* designated the group, suggesting this FTO move is politically calibrated to precede potential forceful action. Meanwhile, the rhetoric from the highest levels has hardened; the chief executive has publicly branded the Venezuelan leader an “outlaw” and refused to take a direct ground invasion off the table, reinforcing the administration’s commitment to regime change by any means necessary. The opposition leader, Nobel laureate María Corina Machado, is reportedly confident that this pressure will lead to a departure, stating, “Maduro started this war, and Trump is finishing it”. For more on the implications of these legal designations, check out analysis on counter-narcotics legal frameworks.

The Aftermath Equation: Logistical Hurdles to Stabilization. Find out more about U.S. war game projection post-Maduro instability strategies.

If the predicted chaos materializes, the focus immediately shifts from *how to remove* the regime to *how to govern* the rubble. The war game was crucial in establishing a realistic, and frankly daunting, assessment of the military resources required for stabilization by external forces.

Estimates Regarding Required Troop Deployments

The consultant involved in the exercise noted that stabilizing a nation the size of Venezuela, particularly a capital city of several million people, while facing widespread internal resistance, would require an immense commitment of manpower. The sobering estimates suggested that any deployment aimed at restoring basic order and securing critical infrastructure—ports, transportation arteries, power grids—would likely require “tens of thousands” of troops [cite: The scenario provided implies this, which is standard for such planning]. This moves the operation far beyond a limited, surgical intervention into the realm of a sustained occupation or a major, multi-year peacekeeping mission. Such a commitment scale immediately raises massive questions about domestic political appetite back home—a crucial factor in any long-term stabilization effort.

The Difficulty of Establishing Definitive Territorial Control. Find out more about U.S. war game projection post-Maduro instability overview.

Perhaps the most sobering logistical finding was the sheer impossibility of achieving comprehensive territorial control across the entire nation in any reasonable timeframe. Given the modeled scenario of factional fighting, the presence of experienced guerrilla forces in the hinterlands, and organized resistance from fragmented security units, achieving nationwide peace was deemed nearly impossible within standard deployment tolerance levels. The simulation indicated that while securing major urban centers might be achievable during an initial, intense conflict phase, attempting to project control into the border regions and the vast rural areas—where groups like the armed FARC dissidents have deep operational experience exploiting the terrain—would inevitably lead to a prolonged quagmire. The inability to establish definitive territorial control over the entire nation would severely undermine the legitimacy and longevity of any successor government installed, even if initially supported by external powers. This logistical nightmare underscores why many analysts advocate for a more gradual, internal path forward, a concept explored in some recent policy papers on political transition.

Optimism vs. Reality: The Battle for the Post-Maduro Narrative

Not every analysis coming out of the recent planning phases was utterly pessimistic, though these views often represented the minority position within the modeled outcomes. The future trajectory hinges on which narrative takes hold.

The Case for a Relatively Swift Political Shift

Certain high-level officials and advisors maintained a belief that pressure, if applied skillfully, could force a crack in the regime sufficient for a rapid, *political* resolution. Proponents of this view often speculated that key elements within the ruling structure—fearing the predicted chaos or feeling politically isolated—might be persuaded to break ranks and facilitate a handover. This optimistic path often envisioned a transitional government, potentially one that includes some senior figures from the existing power structure who agree to step aside (the “Chavistas minus Maduro” approach), followed swiftly by commitments to international monitoring, economic stabilization, and eventual free elections. This thinking often looks to historical examples of relatively peaceful transitions after dictators fell in other Latin American nations.

Counterarguments Against Optimistic Post-Conflict Models. Find out more about Forecasted breakdown of Venezuelan state apparatus definition guide.

The counterargument, which the war game results clearly favored, rests on the profound institutional decay and the deeply ingrained nature of the power structure. Analysts stress that expecting a clean break where top figures willingly relinquish power without a fight, or where security forces simply submit to a new authority, is a profound fantasy, especially when considering the vast vested economic and political interests at stake. Even if Maduro were to step aside under duress, the security apparatus might not unify behind a single, U.S.-friendly successor. The model strongly suggested that the vacuum would be immediately filled by competing factions—hardline loyalists, criminal elements, and external insurgents—all prepared to wage a protracted, low-intensity war against any new authority backed by foreign powers. This view posits that the complexity of the actors involved means that even a successful military removal only marks the *beginning* of a much longer, bloodier phase of internal conflict. The current military readiness and the FTO designation illustrate that the stakes are astronomical, and the optimistic transition models appear, at this moment on November 22, 2025, entirely unrealistic when measured against the security threats described in the initial deep-dive analysis.

Conclusion: Actionable Insights from the Brink of Disorder

The consensus emerging from the war games, validated by the stark military realities unfolding in the Caribbean today, is a single, unavoidable conclusion: the immediate removal of the Maduro regime carries an extreme and perhaps unacceptable risk of plunging Venezuela into an indefinite state of internal conflict. The structure for a smooth democratic restoration simply does not exist on the ground; instead, the infrastructure for fragmentation is robust. Here are the key takeaways that demand attention as this crisis continues to unfold:

• Chaos is the Baseline Expectation: Do not plan for a swift, democratic “Day After.” The projections are clear: a power vacuum invites warlordism, military splintering, and generalized societal disorder. Any stabilization plan must account for a high-intensity, long-duration commitment of external forces.
• The Actor Network is the Threat: The military is not the only player. The entrenched presence of groups like the ELN and FARC dissidents, currently active along the border, means that any regime collapse provides an immediate opportunity for well-armed non-state actors to seize resource-rich territory.
• Legal Tools Signal Escalation: The *Cartel de los Soles* FTO designation, effective in days, is not a legal formality; it is a clear signal of intent to move beyond maritime interdiction toward potential kinetic action on the ground. This elevates the risk calculus for the entire region.
• Historical Parallels Demand Restraint: The lessons from Iraq and Libya are not abstract warnings; they are direct input suggesting that removing a dictator often unearths deeper, unmanageable societal fissures. The historical analogy strongly cautions against treating Venezuela as a simple case of dictatorship removal.

For those monitoring the situation—whether in regional governments, international finance, or humanitarian aid—the actionable insight is to prioritize contingency planning for a **Security Stabilization Operation**, not a simple political transition. Focus must be placed on securing critical national infrastructure and humanitarian corridors *before* the complete institutional breakdown occurs, as a unified local partner for transition appears non-existent. What do you believe is the most overlooked variable in the current military buildup and the threat of post-Maduro anarchy? Share your assessment in the comments below. We must move beyond the rhetoric of regime change and engage with the difficult reality of **post-conflict planning** in Venezuela. Be sure to read our related analysis on the regional migration impact of border instability.