The Calculus of Coercion: Analyzing the “Convenience” of a US Declaration of Conflict with Venezuela
The escalating confrontation between the United States and Venezuela in late 2025 has moved far beyond traditional diplomatic friction, evolving into a multifaceted campaign of economic strangulation underscored by a massive projection of naval power. The premise that such an action is “convenient” for the aggressor nation belies the immense geopolitical risks and historical precedents that suggest a high probability of a costly, protracted entanglement. The recent application of coercive power, particularly the explicit interdiction of Venezuela’s primary revenue stream, signals an operational shift that many foreign policy analysts view as an *de facto* act of war, even in the absence of a formal declaration.
The Economic Blockade: Severing Venezuela’s Lifelines
Beyond the immediate military tension, the economic front has seen perhaps the most direct and far-reaching application of coercive power, particularly targeting the lifeblood of the Venezuelan state: its oil revenue. The imposition of what the President termed a blockade signals a profound escalation beyond mere sanctions.
The Presidential Decree to Close Airspace and Interdict Shipping
In late November two thousand twenty-five, the President issued a social media declaration stating that the airspace above and surrounding Venezuela was to be considered entirely closed to all airlines, pilots, and traffickers. This unilateral declaration, made on November 29, 2025, via Truth Social, was immediately condemned by Caracas as a “colonialist threat” affecting sovereignty. This move triggered a *de facto* air blockade as foreign airlines suspended flights to avoid risk.
This was swiftly followed by the physical enforcement of a maritime interdiction policy, culminating in the seizure of a tanker carrying Venezuelan crude off the coast in early December. The operationalization of this blockade was formalized when on December 16, 2025, the President announced a “TOTAL AND COMPLETE BLOCKADE OF ALL SANCTIONED OIL TANKERS going into, and out of, Venezuela”. This initial seizure involved the tanker Skipper on December 10, 2025. This operationalizes a blockade, which foreign policy analysts recognized as an act of war in itself when not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council or accompanied by a formal declaration of conflict. The President justified this move by stating the goal was to compel the return of previously held assets, explicitly naming oil as the primary focus.
Quantifiable Impact on Crude Oil Exports and Global Trade Flows
The enforcement actions have delivered a significant economic blow, dramatically disrupting the mechanisms Venezuela relied upon for international trade. Industry data shared in December two thousand twenty-five indicated a massive upheaval in the “dark fleet” of tankers that had been attempting to circumvent previous sanctions. Many of these high-risk vessels were observed rerouting to distant waters like the Indian Ocean to evade the assembled U.S. naval forces, while others were reportedly trapped or engaging in location manipulation.
Quantified data illustrates the severity of the pressure campaign: Venezuelan oil exports had already fallen dramatically from approximately 1.4 million barrels per day in 2019 to a reported average of 772,000 bpd in 2024. Specifically, one analysis noted that by December 2025, current enforcement operations had reduced Venezuelan crude flows to approximately 258,000 barrels per day, a 76% reduction from the 1.08 million bpd recorded in December 2024. The seizures and threats of further interdiction solidify the intent to starve the regime of its critical foreign currency earnings. The recent seizure of the Panamanian-flagged tanker Centuries, carrying up to 2 million barrels of crude, underscores the intent to target even non-sanctioned vessels involved in the “shadow fleet”.
Analysis of Conventional Force Projection vs. Insurgency Realities
While the military hardware deployed suggests a capacity for a high-intensity conventional engagement, geopolitical and military strategists are quick to temper expectations, pointing to the immense logistical and political difficulties inherent in conquering and occupying a nation the size of Venezuela. The focus is less on a swift victory and more on the potential for a protracted, costly entanglement.
Assessment of Deployment Sufficiency for Full-Scale Invasion Scenarios
Despite the impressive display of naval force, which includes the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier strike group and other amphibious and destroyer assets—representing the largest U.S. naval concentration in the region in decades—multiple sources confirm that the deployed assets are vastly insufficient for a traditional, large-scale ground invasion aimed at regime overthrow or occupation. Expert assessments suggest that the troops currently positioned in the region would be outnumbered by a factor of between five and twenty times the necessary force required to successfully invade a country of Venezuela’s vast geographic scope. The deployment appears calibrated for sustained air and sea operations, interdiction, and perhaps limited strikes on specific targets, rather than the mobilization required to secure major population centers or effectively manage the country post-conflict. Venezuela’s government has responded by mobilizing over 15,000 regular troops and activating a civilian paramilitary network estimated at four million members.
The Historical Cautionary Tale of Extended Counterinsurgency Campaigns
The shadow of past, costly overseas interventions looms heavily over the current calculus. Analysts frequently draw parallels between the proposed kinetic operations and historical conflicts, noting that even a successful conventional phase would likely transition into years of grueling counterinsurgency campaigns against dispersed, well-mobilized, and potentially hostile local forces. The experience from engagements in the Middle East over the preceding two decades has demonstrated that regime change, even if swiftly achieved in the initial phase, frequently results in far greater instability and a costly, indefinite commitment of resources and lives. The danger, as some observers note, is that Washington might be walking into a quagmire similar to the one experienced in Iraq, where the initial rationale quickly dissolved into a long war with uncertain political outcomes. The very nature of the current coercion—naval buildup coupled with threats of land strikes—echoes past “gunboat diplomacy” tactics.
Broader Implications: The Strain on Global Hegemonic Capacity
The escalation in the Caribbean is not occurring in a vacuum; it is set against a backdrop of other significant international challenges, leading to concerns that a focused conflict with Venezuela could place an untenable strain on the United States’ overall military and diplomatic resources. The decisions made in the Caribbean have cascading effects across the global strategic chessboard.
The Intersecting Global Security Concerns and Resource Allocation
Of particular concern is the timing of the rising tensions with Caracas relative to other geopolitical flashpoints, most notably the persistent and escalating threat posed by Iran and its proxies. With strategic rivals like China and Russia actively supporting the Venezuelan government through oil purchases and supply lines, engaging in a protracted conflict in South America would necessarily divert critical military assets—such as precision-guided munitions like Tomahawk missiles—and attention from other theaters. If Washington finds itself mired in a costly, resource-draining conflict with Venezuela, its capacity to support allies in the Middle East or respond effectively to potential escalations there could be significantly curtailed, representing a major strategic overstretch.
Forecasting the Consequences of a Protracted Engagement
The ultimate consequence of miscalculation, or the decision to proceed with coercion short of a full invasion, remains the potential for the complete unraveling of the Venezuelan state itself, even if the initial military objectives are met. The destruction of infrastructure, the deepening of internal divisions, and the subsequent humanitarian crisis would create an immense burden of reconstruction and stabilization for any intervening power. Furthermore, the geopolitical landscape has already shifted, with Venezuela’s allies leveraging the situation to reinforce their own positions, suggesting that even a ‘victory’ might result in long-term strategic losses, cementing anti-hegemonic blocs and further eroding international legitimacy for unilateral interventionist policies. The convenience suggested by the initial premise of the conflict must be weighed against the immeasurable cost of a regional destabilization that could endure for years to come.